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Identity-based cryptosystems utilize some arbitrary strings as the participants’ public key in the underlying system. The encryptioner will not need to obtain
the decryptioner’s certificate. That will simplify the certificate management. Therefore, it is still interesting to propose some new identity-based encryption
schemes. In this paper, we will propose two new different constructions, i.e. receiptor-oriented encryption schemes. They are both identity-based encryption
schemes and also based on pairings. The proposed encryption schemes have a new advantage, i.e. backward-and-forward security. In addition, we provide
the security analysis for the proposed schemes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Public key cryptography has been widely involved in today’s
digital life, such as network communication, wireless commu-
nication, smart cards, etc. [13, 16, 26]. Public key encryption
technique plays an important role in its utilization of public key
cryptography. Very recently, some new semantically secure en-
cryption schemes are attracting attention. Galindo et al proposed
two schemes [6, 7]. However, most of the previous encryption
schemes have not provided several properties; One of these prop-
erties is backward-and-forward security, i.e. some partial keys of
participants can be changed with ongoing time. This property is
necessary, since an attacker may given all the time catch up with
a targeted communication channel and try to break the underly-
ing private key. Therefore, it is potentially important to construct
new semantically secure public key encryption schemes which
have the above backward-and-forward security property. In this
paper, we will propose two such schemes.
Identity-based cryptosystems and cryptographic protocols
have also been paid more attention over the years since Shamir
proposed the first identity-based encryptions and signatures [18].
The benefits of identity-based cryptosystems and cryptographic
protocols are that they use some arbitrary strings as the partic-
ipant’s public key in the underlying schemes. Thus it will not
need the encryptioner to obtain the decryptioner’s certificate.
Therefore, that will simplify certificate management [16]. Some
identity-based signatures, encryptions, key agreement, and sign-
cryption were proposed in references [2, 11, 12]. In this paper,
we will propose two identity-based semantically secure encryp-
tion schemes.
Recently, the bilinear pairings modified fromWeil or Tate pair-
ings [1, 11] are becoming one of the new active research topics
in information security. Especially, the supersingular curves
are the main object used by the bilinear pairings. However,
prior to [2, 11], the supersingular curves were undesirable in
cryptographic settings since Weil pairing can reduce the dis-
crete logarithm problems in supersingular curves to that in an
extension of the underlying finite field. Thanks to Joux [11]
and Boneh et al [2], the pairings have become desirable and
applied to various cryptographic schemes: identity-based signa-
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tures [11, 23], encryptions [2, 19], confirmer/undeniable signa-
tures [14, 24, 24], key agreement [11], committal deniable sig-
nature [14], signcryption [12], and blind signature with message
recovery [4, 21, 25]. Bilinear pairs were also used to construct
a knapsack diffie-hellman family [8, 9].
In our paper, we will propose two new public key encryption
schemes different from [2, 19]. And the new construc-
tions are motivated by some techniques from references
[3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 19].
The organization of the rest of our paper is as follows: The
definition of receiptor-oriented encryption scheme is presented
in section 2. Section 3 provides the new cryptosystems. The
security and efficiency analysis is given in section 4 and section
5, respectively. The conclusion is in section 6.
2. DEFINITIONS OF RECEIPTOR-
ORIENTED ENCRYPTIONS
In this section, the definition of the receiptor-oriented encryption
system is presented as follows. This follows [19].
Definition 1 (Receiptor-Oriented Encryptions) A receiptor-
oriented encryption (abbr. ROE) scheme is a public key
cryptosystem comprised of the following three procedures,
and in which two entities (encryptioner and decryptioner) are
involved:
(1) Key Generation: On input a security parameter , this prob-
abilistic algorithm returns the long-term public keys and
private keys for the encriptioner (pk2, sk2) and the decrip-
tioner (pk1, sk1) respectively. Simultaneously, this algo-
rithm also outputs a pair of specified time-stage(ti) public
key pkti and private key skti for the oriented receiptor, i.e.
the decryptioner. The initialized time-stage is t0. There-
fore, the initial time-stage public key and private key for
the decryptioner are pkt0 and skt0 , respectively. The rela-
tionship of the three main keypairs (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2)
and (pkti , skti ) are as follows: (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2) are
long-term keys, while (pkti , skti ) are short-term (i.e. spec-
ified time-stage) keys; Suppose a message m is encrypted
in time-stage ti : for encryption, the keys including pk1,
(pk2, sk2) and pkti will be involved in the generation of
a ciphertext cti of m; for decryption, the keys (pk1, sk1),
pk2 and (pkti , skti ) will be involved in the generation of the
plaintext (i.e. m) from cti .
(2) Encryption: This is a probabilistic algorithm carried by the
encryptioner. Given a plaintext m, the encryptioner will
encrypt m by use of its own long-term public key pk2 and
private key sk2. During the encrypting, the encryptioner
will also use the oriented receiptor’s (i.e. decryptioner’s)
specified time-stage public key pkti and long-term public
key pk1. In addition, some random elements chosen by the
encryptioner will be involved. In the end, the encryptioner
publishes the ciphertext C (of plaintext m) on its homepage.
Furthermore, its homepage will be renewed in time.
(3) Decryption: This is an algorithm done by the decryptioner.
The algorithm inputs the ciphertext C, the decryptioner’s
long-term public key pk1 and private key sk1, its specified
time-stage public key pkti and private key skti , as well as
the encryptioner’s public key pk2. In the end, the plaintext
m will be returned.
Definition 2 (Requirements of a Secure ROE System) A se-
cure receiptor oriented public key encryption system must satisfy
at least the following three requirements.
(1) Soundness: For any plaintext m ∈ M (M is the plaintext
space), and for any given time stage ti , there always holds
that:
Dpk1,pk2,sk1,skti ,pkti (Epk1,pk2,sk2,pkti (m, r)) = m (1)
where E and D are the encryption and the decryption al-
gorithms respectively; r is a random element chosen by the
encryptioner; pk1, pkti , and sk1, skti are the decryptioner’s
public keys and private keys respectively; pk2 and sk2 are
the encryptioner’s public and private keys, respectively.
(2) Semantic Security: For any m0 ∈ M(M is the plaintext
space), for any polynomial time attacker A, who can input
the public keys of the encryptioner and decryptioner, cannot
distinguish the ciphertext c (of plaintext m) from a random
element φ ∈R C (C is the ciphertext space) in polynomial
time.
(3) Backward-and-Forward Security: This property is with
respect to the oriented receiptor while its specified time-
stage private skti is compromised by an attcker A.
Backward-and-forward security means that even though an
attacker A obtains the time-stage private skti for the time
stage ti , A is still not able to do the followings:
• figure out the plaintext of any ciphertext c encrypted
during time-stage ti .
• derive the former time-stage ti−1’s private key skti−1
from skti .
• calculate the latter time-stage ti+1’s private key skti+1
from skti .
3. ID-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
In this section we will propose two identity-based receiptor-
oriented encryption schemes (ID-based ROE schemes). We
develop the constructions motivated by some techniques from
[3, 6, 7, 12]. The proposed identity-based encryption schemes
are based on pairings over elliptic curves. We will first re-
view some mathematical tools, that will be used in the proposed
schemes.
3.1 Notations
In this paper, we choose  as the security parameter for all the
proposed receiptor-oriented encryption schemes. Letq be a large
prime, and Z∗q be Zq\{0}. Fq denotes a finite field with q ele-
ments.
⊕
denotes the bit-wise XOR calculation. Let n be a posi-
tive integer with n = ©(). Let H and H1 be two cryptographic
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hash functions: H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, and H1 : G2 → {0, 1}n;
where H1 is a universal one-way hash function [11, 16]. G1 and
G2 will be given later.
Definition 3 Let p > 3 be a prime. An elliptic curve over the
the finite field Fp, denoted by Ep(a, b) or E(a, b)/Fp, where
a, b ∈ Fp, and gcd(4a3 +27, b2) = 1, is the set of points P(x,y)
such that y2 = (x3 + ax + b)mod p, together with a point Ô
[15], called the point at infinity.
In our paper, we choose elliptic curves E(a, b)/Fp with y2 =
(x3 + ax + b)mod p such that:
• a = 0; b is some random integer with gcd(27b2, p) = 1.
For simplicity, b may be equal 1.
• p ≡ 2mod 3. In this case, the order of E(0, b)/Fp(the
number of it) is |E(0, b)/Fp| = p + 1, and thus avoiding
the difficulty of computing |E(a, b)/Fp|.
• the bit length of p is ; and  may be 160 or larger than it
for security reason.
3.2 Pairings over Elliptic Curves
Let p be a sufficiently large prime that satisfies: (a) p ≡ 2mod 3;
(b) p = 6q − 1, where q is also a large prime. Consider the
elliptic curves E/Fp defined by the equation:
y2 = x3 + 1. (2)
Let G1 be an additive group of points of prime order q on the
elliptic curve E/Fp and let G2 be a multiplicative group of same
order q of some finite field Fp2 . We are able to derive a bilinear
pairing from the Weil pairing or Tate pairing [1, 4]:
e : G1 × G1 → G2 (3)
with respect to which the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
(ECDL) problems are difficult in G1 and the Computational
Diffi-Hellman (CDH) problems and the Inversion of Weil pairing
(IWP) problem are difficult in G2.
The pairing e : G1 × G1 → G2 has the following properties:
(1) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for every pair P, Q ∈
G1 and for any a, b ∈ Zp.
(2) Non-degenerate: there exists at least one point P ∈ G1
such that e(P, P ) = 1.
(3) Efficient Computability: there are efficient algorithms to
compute the bilinear pairings e.
3.3 ID-based ROE Scheme 1
By the definition of ROE system in section 2, the ROE system 1
has three algorithms:
(1) Key Generation The KGC first chooses an elliptic curve
E/Fp as in section 3. And then it chooses G1, G2, P ,
e(∗, ∗) as above in the same section. It then chooses s ∈ Zq
and computes domain public key PKGC = sP . The encryp-
tioner and the receiptor-oriented decryptioner’s respective
identities id2 and id1 as their prime public keys. Then, the
decryptioner’s long-term public key and private key are re-
spectively S1 = sQ1 and Q1; the encryptioner’s long-term
public key and private key are respectively S2 = sQ2 and
Q2; where Q1 = H(id1) and Q2 = H(id2). Since the
decryptioner is a receiptor-oriented entity, so by the defini-
tion she will have a pair of specified time-stage private key
skti and public key pkti . The initialized time-stage is t0.
Therefore, the initial time-stage public key and private key
for the decryptioner may take pkt0 = υP and skt0 = υ, re-
spectively. In addition, the plaintext space is M = {0, 1}n.
(2) Encryption This is a probabilistic algorithm done by the
encryptioner. For any plaintext m ∈ M ,
• the encryptioner chooses uniformly and randomly an
element r ∈ Z∗q , and computes c1 = rP .
• the encryptioner then computes c2 = e(rQ1, PKGC)
e(S2, υP ), and c3 = H1(c2), respectively.
• At the last step, he computes c4 = c3 ⊕ m.
Then, he publishes the ciphertext {c1, c4}.
(3) Decryption This is a deterministic algorithm done by
the receiptor-oriented decryptioner. Given the ciphertext
{c1, c4},
• she first calculates d1 = e(υQ2, PKGC) · e(S1, c1).
• she then calculates d2 = H1(d1).
• she recovers the plaintext by m = d2 ⊕ c4. If the
ciphertext is invalid one, then she recovers nothing .
In the above encryption algorithm, the computation of cipher-
text of plaintext m combines the encryptioner’s public and pri-
vate keys with the decryptioner’s public key and the specified
time-stage public key. In addition, some random elements and a
universal collision-free one-way hash function are also involved.
3.4 ID-based ROE Scheme 2
By the definition of ROE system in section 2, the ROE system 2
has three algorithms:
(1) Key Generation The KGC first chooses an elliptic curve
E/Fp as in section 3. And then it chooses G1, G2, P ,
e(∗, ∗) as above in the same section. It then chooses s ∈ Zq
and computes domain public key PKGC = sP . The encryp-
tioner and the receiptor-oriented decryptioner’s respective
identities id2 and id1 as their prime public keys. Then, the
decryptioner’s long-term public key and private key are re-
spectively S1 = sQ1 and Q1; the encryptioner’s long-term
public key and private key are respectively S2 = sQ2 and
Q2; where Q1 = H(id1) and Q2 = H(id2). Since the
decryptioner is a receiptor-oriented entity, so by the defini-
tion she will have a pair of specified time-stage private key
skti and public key pkti . The initialized time-stage is t0.
Therefore, the initial time-stage public key and private key
for the decryptioner may (without loss of generality) take
pkt0 = αQ1 and skt0 = α, respectively.
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(2) Encryption This is a polynomially probabilistic algorithm
done by the encryptioner. For any plaintext m ∈ M ,
• the encryptioner chooses uniformly and randomly an
element r ∈ Z∗q , and computes c1 = rQ2.
• the encryptioner then computes c2 = e(αQ1 +
rQ1, S2), and c3 = H1(c2), respectively.
• At the last step, he computes c4 = c3 ⊕ m.
Then, he publishes the ciphertext {c1, c4}.
(3) Decryption This is a deterministic algorithm done by
the receiptor-oriented decryptioner. Given the ciphertext
{c1, c4},
• she first calculates d1 = e(c1 + αQ2, S1).
• she then calculates d2 = H1(d1).
• she recovers the plaintext by m = d2 ⊕ c4. If the
ciphertext is invalid one, then she recovers nothing .
It is easy to see the difference between the above two ROE
schemes is that the former has two pairing evaluations on both
encryption and decryption; and the latter has only one such eval-
uation. Probably, the second one is more efficient than the first.
Fortunately, in identity-based ROE system 1, one of the two
pairing evaluations could be preprocessed.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will prove that both of the two identity-
based ROE schemes have the soundness, semantic security, and
backward-and-forward security.
4.1 Soundness
The soundness of the receiptor-oriented encryption schemes is
that: if the encryptioner correctly calculates the ciphertexts ac-
cording to the descriptions of encryption algorithm, and if the
decryptioner correctly carries on the decryption algorithm, then
the latter will surely recovers the corresponding plaintexts.
Theorem 1 The two identity-based receiptor-oriented encryp-
tion schemes in section 4 both have the soundness. In other
words, if {c1, c4} is a legal ciphertext returned by the encryp-
tioner on plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n, then the decryptioner will surely
recovers the plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n such that
DQ1,Q2,S1,skt0 ,pkt0 (EQ2,Q1,S2,pkt0 (m, r)) = m (4)
where E and D are the encryption and the decryption algorithms,
respectively; r is a random element chosen by the encryptioner;
and other data are the same to what are in the two identity-based
ROE schemes in section 4.
Proof. Because of the similar proofs on the two ROE schemes,
the authors only present the theorem proof for the identity-based
ROE system 1.
By the encryption algorithm of the identity-based ROE system
1, we can write
c1 = rP ;
c2 = e(rQ1, PKGC)e(S2, υP )(mod q);
c3 = H(c2);
c4 = c3 ⊕ m.
where r ∈ Z∗q is a random element.
Since d1 = e(υQ2, PKGC) · e(S1, c1), and by the key gener-
ation algorithm, therefore d1 = e(υQ2, PKGC) · e(S1, c1)
= e(υQ2, sP )e(sQ1, c1)
= e(Q2, P )sυe(Q1, P )sr (mod q)
= e(sQ2, υP ) · e(rQ1, sP )




Thus, the recovered plaintext is
m = c3 ⊕ c4 = d2 ⊕ c4.
Therefore, the soundness is satisfied in this system.
4.2 Semantic Security
The semantic security of the receiptor-oriented encryption
schemes is that: if for any plaintext m0 ∈ {0, 1}n(the plain-
text space), for any polynomial time attacker A, who can input
the public keys of the encryptioner and decryptioner, cannot dis-
tinguish the ciphertext c(of plaintext m) from a random element
φ ∈R C (C is the ciphertext space) in polynomial time.
Theorem 2 The two identity-based receiptor-oriented encryp-
tion schemes in section 4 both have the semantic security. In
other words, if {c1, c4} is any legal ciphertext returned by the
encryptioner on plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n, then any probabilistic
polynomial time attacker A will distinguish between {c1, c4} and
{, } with negligible probability; where  and  are two ran-
dom elements belonging to G1 and G2, respectively.
Proof. Notice that, by the descriptions on encryption algorithms
of the identity-based receiptor-oriented encryption system 1 in
section 4, and without of generality, we may let c1 = ζP
c2 = e(ζQ1, PKGC)e(S2, pkti )(mod q)
c3 = H1(c2)
c4 = c3 ⊕ m.
where ζ ∈ Z∗q is an unknown (with respect toA) random element;
pkti and Q1 are the decryptioner’s specified time-stage public
key and long-term public key, respectively. m is any plaintext in
{0, 1}n. PKGC is the domain public parameter.
Since ζ is a random element in Z∗q , c1 = ζP is a random ele-
ment in G1. In addition, c2 is also random in G2 since e(∗, ∗) is
a bilinear map from G1 ×G1 to G2. Therefore, by the definition
of universal collision-free one-way hash function [11], we know
that c4 = c3 ⊕ m is a random element in G2. What’s more, the
attacker A does not know the value of ζ ∈ Z∗q and S2 ∈ G1.
Hence, from the point of view of the attacker A, {c1, c4} is a
random pair in G1 × G2. Therefore, the probability of attacker
A tells {c1, c4} from {, } is approximately 1/q2.
According to the above analysis, any probabilistic polynomial
time attacker A will distinguish between {c1, c4} and {, } only
with negligible probability.
306 computer systems science & engineering
S. HAN ET AL
4.3 Backward-and-Forward Security
The backward-and-forward security is formalized with respect to
the oriented receiptor while its specified time-stage private skti
is compromised by a probabilistic polynomial time attcker A.
Backward-and-future security means that even though attacker
A obtains the time-stage private skti for the time stage ti , A is
still not able to: (1) figure out the corresponding plaintext of any
ciphertext c encrypted during time-stage ti ; (2) derive the former
time-stage ti−1’s private key skti−1 from skti ; (3) calculate the
latter time-stage ti+1’s private key skti+1 based on skti .
Theorem 3 The two identity based receiptor-oriented encryp-
tion schemes in section 4 both have the backward-and-forward
security defined in section 2.
Proof. Due to the similar construction of the two identity based
ROE schemes, we will prove this theorem with identity based
ROE system 1.
Without of generality, we may assume there is a probabilis-
tic polynomial time attacker A, who already (because of some
special reason) compromised the time-stage private key skti of
the decryptioner during the course of ti . In addition, suppose
{c1, c4} is any legal ciphertext on an arbitrary plaintext m enci-
phered by the encryptioner. To complete the proof, we may by
the encryption algorithm assume that c1 = ηP ;
c2 = e(ηQ1, sP )e(sQ2, vP );
c3 = H1(c2);
c4 = c3 ⊕ m.
where η is a random element; and the compromised private key
by attacker A is skti = v.
Now we will prove the probabilistic polynomial time attacker
A will not be able to:
(1) figure out the corresponding plaintext m of {c1, c4};
(2) derive the former time-stage private key skti−1 (of the de-
crytioner) from skti = vP ;
(3) calculate the latter time-stage private key skti+1 (of the de-
cryptioner) based on skti = vP .
Notice that η and s are both hidden i.e. unknown by the
attacker A from the information theoretical view. Therefore,
(1) By the assumption of ECDL, A is not able to inverse η from
c1 = ηP . At the same time,
c2 = e(ηQ1, sP )e(sQ2, vP )
= e(ηQ1, P )se(sQ2, P )v
= e(sηQ1, P )e(vsQ2, P )
= e(sηQ1 + vsQ2, P )
By the IWP assumption, A is not able to compute d1. Con-
sequently, A is not able to figure d2 = H1(d1). Therefore,
she is not able to figure out the plaintext m = d3 = d2 ⊕d4.
(2) By the construction of the identity based ROE system 1,
both the decryptioner’s time-stage private key skti and skti−1
are randomly and uniformly chosen by the decrypitoner
from Z∗q . Therefore, from the point of view of attacker A,
skti and skti−1 have no relationship useful to attacker A.
Thus, she will be not able to derive the former time-stage
private key skti−1 from skti .
(3) Due to the similar reason as above (2), attacker A is not
able to calculate the latter time-stage private key skti+1 (of
the decryptioner) based on skti = vP .
5. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
When all the new proposed semantically secure encryption
schemes are implemented, the performance of them is domi-
nated by the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm
respectively.
We first investigate the expansion factor, i.e. the ratio between
the lengths of the cipher text and the plaintext. The expansion
factor of the proposed new schemes is the same as that of [2].
By this definition, we can use some compression technique ap-
plying to the cipher text {c1, c4} (of message m) to get its length
equal to c4 [19]. Therefore, the expansion factor of all our new
schemes is 1, and at most 2. In terms of encryption algorithms,
the dominated computation is the bilinear pairing evaluation.
The encryption for identity-based ROE system 1 needs two bi-
linear pairing evaluations, and one of them can be precomputed.
While id-based ROE system 2 only needs one pairing evalua-
tion. Because of the symmetric construction of the encryption
and decryption algorithms, so they have the same computation
workloads. On the other hand, our schemes are identity-based
encryption schemes, while those in [6, 7, 19] are not identity-
based ones. Therefore, our encryption schemes are better than
those of [6, 7, 19], from the certificate management point of view
[16]. In addition, the scheme in [19] involves two pairing eval-
uations, while the proposed scheme only needs one evaluation.
The following table presents the complexity comparison of
the encryption algorithm between the Scheme in [2] and the new
ROE scheme 2 in our paper. Please refer to the appendix.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed two identity-based receiptor-oriented en-
cryption schemes: id-based ROE scheme 1 and id-based ROE
scheme 2. Both of the proposed encryption schemes have a new
security characteristic, namely backward-and-forward security.
This means that if an attacker were able to obtain the private key
for a particular time stage, be it not able to obtain the former and
later time stage private keys not is it able to figure out the plain-
text corresponding to ciphertext encrypted at that time stage. In
addition, We proved that both of the new schemes possess sound-
ness, semantic security, and backward-and-forward security. A
complexity comparison was presented. From the complexity
comparison, the id-based ROE scheme 2 is more efficient and
reliable in terms of backward-and-forward security.
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